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IINTRODUCTION
This paper came about as a synthesis of interests in ships,
railroads and history. Perhaps no other port on the East Coast
has such a strong blend of these three forces as the Port of
Baltimore. This paper is about the interaction of railroads
and the port and how this interaction continues to play a major
role in the Port of Baltimore's development. The original hy-
pothesis assumed that Baltimore's strong history with the rail-
roads made her a railroad port. But hard times and competi-
tive truck rates have driven the railroads out of Baltimore to
such an extent that rail service in the Port of Baltimore may
not be able to handle projected container (and coal) traffic.
In this paper, the above hypothesis was put to the test of avail-
able facts and interviews to see if indeed the Port of Balti-
more was losing a valuable service. The author's conclusion
is that the railroads are leaving the Port and that the rail
infrastructure may not be capable of handling future demands
for container traffic.
This paper is an observation and investigation of a situa-
tion that currently is affecting the Port of Baltimore. The
data presented is the most current and accurate that the au-
thor could find. Any omissions or inaccuracies were made un-
consciously and corrections will be gratefully acknowledged
2The Port of Baltimore, since its beginning as a gateway for
interior commerce in 1706, has been affected by changes in
American transportation through every stage in its development.
The Port of Baltimore actually began twenty-three years before
the City of Baltimore was incorporated. In fact, the ports of
Annapolis and Oxford were strong rival ports until the hinter-
land and harbor in Baltimore developed. Despite some early
manufacturing in the inner harbor area, Baltimore was, until
the 1950s and 60s, primarily a bulk shipping port. In 1758,
the first shipments of grain left for Europe from the mudflats
of the inner harbor. Due to its large tobacco exports, the
port was not blockaded in the Revolutionary War. During the
Second World War, the port was the source of all coal for the
Marshall Plan in Europe.
In 1827, the B&O Railroad laid the first tracks to the
port and began an extensive linkage with the Midwest hinter-
lands that remains today with three major railroads in the
port. l The Post Civil War era was the real beginning of
Baltimore as a port for international cargo. The expanding
hinterlands were ready for the railroads to rebuild their
once extensive connections ruined in the war. Three main rail-
roads played a major part in developing the Port of Baltimore.
They were the Baltimore and Ohio, the Pennsylvania (now
Conrail) and the Western Maryland. These railroads built and
maintained most of the early port facilities and gave the rail-
roads an extremely heavy hand in port development.
3These terminals. . were designed to accommodate the
surge of passengers and cargos from overseas and to
carry imports back inland. Huge by the standards of
their day, they made Baltimore a "railroad port" with
its policies and growth determined in large measure by
the owners of these major facilities. 2
The railroads' growth peaked just after the turn of the century
and during the First World War they were nationalized in 1917.
Following World War II, Baltimore began to see that her port
was going to have to expand to handle any future cargo needs.
In 1956, the Maryland Port Authority was created by the
state assembly and in 1971 was changed to the Maryland Port
Administration (MPA).
The Maryland Port Authority was formed "to assist and en-
courage the extension and improvement of privately operated
port facilities." The legislature empowered the "Authority"
and later the "Administration" to manage the port's facilities
as efficiently as possible .
. if private facilities are inadequate or in-
adequately operated at any time, to construct and,
if necessary, to operate supplementary public fa-
cilities deemed by it to be required in the public
interest.
Under the Maryland Port "Administration" (MPA) , the port be-
carne one of seven sections of the Department of Transportation,
although still carrying most of the powers voted to it in
1956. The success of the MPA is shown in the port's dramatic
climb to the top as the second largest container facility on
the East and Gulf Coa.sts. During this cha~e, the port became
4public oriented rather than run by private cartels.
Put quite simply, the port during this period has
been transformed from a decaying, railroad domi-
nated collection of outdated piers into a modern
shipper-oriented port with not only a new look but
new identity as well. 4
Seven years after the Maryland Port Authority began, the
first containers were moving across the Atlantic to Northern
Europe. The first shipment began in April 1963. Since that
time, containers have assumed a major section of the general
cargo market and have revolutionized concepts of cargo move-
ment, especially as regards the inland section. While truck
movements have claimed 80% of all inland container traffic in
Baltimore, one would be foolish to assume this trend can con-
tinue, especially with rising fuel costs. A second develop-
ment that might begin to shape Baltimore's market impact is
the new use of mini- (and micro-) bridge through rates. While
the early impacts show minor deviation of container traffic,
this was during a period of heavy Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC) regulation. Recently, the ICC has deregulated the
rates for container movements on railroads (TOFC and COFC) .
By doing this,the distance advantage of Baltimore can become
more effective. But is Baltimore ready for this impact?
In examining the container impact, one cannot overlook the
hinterland development of the general cargo area. Baltimore's
hinterland is constantly changing as new ports make new ser-
vices available. The West Coast is now a competitor for the
Midwestern container markets. Competitively Baltimore is
5holding her own with the four major ports in the North Atlantic
Range (New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk-Hampton
Roads). The MPA has stated that while bulk cargos will be wel-
I~
corned to the port, the main thrust of development by the MPA
will be in the area of new general cargo.
In facility programming efforts, it should be empha-
sized that the Maryland Port Administration has con-
centrated on fostering the general cargo trade of the
Port of Baltimore. Hence, its role as a builder and
operator of general cargo facilities ha~ been one of
steady growth. A review shows that in 1962, the MPA
handled 8 percent of the general cargo of the Port
through its very modest facilities. By 1975, the
percentages approached 70 percent. This is a formida-
ble record, especially when one considers that the
general cargo trade has grown from 4,070,000 short
tons in 1962 to some 7,820,000 short tons in the
record year, 1974. 5
For this reason, the paper will concentrate on the container/
railroad impact. A final section will briefly look at the
coal development in Baltimore and the extremely heavy demand
on rail services that are forecast for as early as 1983.
While the railroads have come and withdrawn with the growth of
trucking, the port cannot overlook he past and potential fu-
ture ties with the railroad.
A few definitions follow to clarify concepts used in later
discussions.
The container (and containerization) is a method of ship-
ping many smaller and irregular packages inside a larger metal
or fiberglass package. This package is a standardized shape
and size so that it will fit in any ship's hold, either con-
tainer or general cargo so designed to carry containers. The
6container will also fit onto trucks or railroad cars built for
this standard size package. Generally, the size of the con-
tainer varies only in length, either twenty, forty, or sixty
feet with width and height constant. Most container traffic
figures are given in TEU's or !wenty foot ~quivalent ~nits
so that a forty-foot container is two TEUs. As mentioned ear-
lier, there are two basic modes of railroad transportation of
containers. The first is Container on Flat Car (COFC) and
the second is Trailer on Flat Car (TOFC) whereby the trailer
with wheels is put on the flat car and shipped to a terminal
and then routed the final distance. This second method is
also called Piggyback Service.
An outgrowth of this technology is a container movement
called "landbridge" or "minibridge," depending on the origin
of the movement. In landbridge the container(s) would be com-
ing from Europe and moving to Japan (or vice versa). See Ap-
pendix A. The containers would use the rail system of the u.S.
rather than the Panama Canal to move the containers to their
final destination. This saves roughly five to nine days of
transit time. The minibridge system is merely landbridge with-
out one of the water legs. In this instance, a container go-
ing from London to Los Angeles would take the water journey to
New York or Baltimore and then be placed in a unit train for
Los Angeles. A unit train is simply a train carrying a homo-
genous cargo for a specific destination. This cuts out delay
enroute switching or terminal work. This also removes the
need for a trip through the Panama Canal.
8II. THE PORT OF BALTIMORE
The Port of Baltimore is located on the Patapsco River, a
tributary of the Upper Chesapeake Bay. The Bay itself is the
largest estuary in the United States, covering 4,400 square
miles. Located just above Cape Hatteras, it can be reached
by two different entrances. The first is through the Virginia
Capes (Cape Henry and Cape Charles) 150 miles south from
Baltimore. From the north, one can enter via the Delaware
River and the Chesapeake and Delaware (C&D) Canal, reaching
Baltimore after a 125 mile transit. Channel depths are a ma-
jor concern for Baltimore which has been trying since 1969 to
get permission to dredge the main channel to the Capes to 50
feet. As of this writing, the project has been approved but
no dredging has begun. The C&D Canal is also up for dredging
as the 35-foot limit makes the larger container vessels return
down the Chesapeake to head north.
As far as inland transportation is concerned, Baltimore
is located almost exactly between New York and Norfolk,
Virginia, each being 200 miles on either side of the port.
Baltimore is also 100 to 200 miles closer to the Midwest in-
dustrial markets. (Please refer to MAP 1.) This is perhaps
the port's strongest selling point, as will be discussed later.
Physically, the port has 45 miles of waterfront which
surround 1600 acres of sheltered harbor area. At least 60
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percent of the waterfront is given to terminals and marine re-
lated industry. (Please refer to Map 2.) Seven percent is
used by former water dependent industries that no longer need
7
the access. There are 90 open and covered cargo piers. Of
these 64 are public general cargo piers and 18 are bulk cargo
piers (privately owned) which shows Baltimore's commitment to
general cargo development. 8 One interesting phenomenon is the
almost constant ratio of bulk to general cargo over the last
10 years. In Table ~ it can be seen that even with the large
increase in container traffic, ~e bulk cargos still remain
roughly 85 percent of the port's cargo. The port is served by
over 100 steamship companies visiting 300 countries with
roughly 335 sailings per week. 9 Baltimore has traditionally
been a bulk port but is constantly trying to balance the gen-
eral bulk cargos so that fluctuations in certain bulk markets
(e.g. grain) do not affect the port's general overall health.
Present day figures for port traffic will show the rela-
tive size of Baltimore's port and facilities. The port handles
roughly 4,000 ships per year. In 1980, there were 4,012 visit-
ing ships; while 1979 had 4,214. Total tonnage was 38,169,000
tons, down a bit from 1979. Containers remained strong with
4.6 million tons passing through the port and 3.6 million be-
ing handled at the major container terminal at Dundalk. Con-
tainers comprised 62 percent of all general cargo which is
one of the highest percentages for any world port. Export ton-
nage was up to 22 million tons versus 18.2 million in 1979.
TABLE 2
Bal t imorl"S P o rr L o n o f t ilt. , F()l ~ (" ign Tradt-.... T'o n nu g s - ~ ( () \' ing
I'h r' o u gh Al l Po r t s of th e Un Lt o u States and Th o s» in t h e
\'orth Atlanti c Hang»
Ca l p nd a r Y~ars 1970-1980
(S » t To ns)
Expor t Comm.. rc (~
Total To t al
l;n ited No r- t h o~ 01' <>:, Of'
Stat p::3 At l an t i c Po r t; of Total Tota l
Ye a r - Po r t s Po r t s Bal t i. mo r-o ~ ~
1 9 ( 1) ~ !IU , 1) ')2. 05: ~ 7~ ,6:;7 ,()00 9 ,J8 5 ,078 '} . 9 12 .9
19 71 21)5 , 1 7 ,'j , 30 0 53 , :,82 ,500 I) , !' 7 5 ,718 :J . 2 12 .1
1 97 ~ 2 :Jl . 4(H , 30!) 56 .19'1 . 000 8 .1 76 ,]3 7 ] · 3 14 . 6
1 9 7 3 27) ,788 , yoo 62 ,J94 ,000 1U , '32 1, 6 9 0 ' j . :- 1 6 . 3
1 9 7 ~ , 2 6 6 , 5 J l,150 7:J , 98 1 , 500 12 , 8 7 6 , 2 4 1 '1. 8 17 . ,
1 9 7 5 2 70 , 8 7 6 , 3UO 71 ,957 ,UOO I J .868 ,82 0 ::; . 1 1 9 . ]
197 6 ~8 1, , 686 . 000 69 ,801 ,::;0 0 I i" 9 4 1' , 601, .5 .~ 2 i . 4
1977 2 73,811, 000 38 , 065 ,000 l'j , OJ9 ,561 .5.1 '2!.J . 2
1978 :301 . 57:I , OOl) 5 1 ,5 7 3, 0 00 11', 3 '39, 1 7 8 J{ .13 27 . 8
197 9 J 39 , J 2 9 , 300 77 ,629 , 000 18,189 ,946 j . 1 .2 ) . !J
19 8 .) "O'} , :1 26 , 0 0 0 ioo , 70 U , 500 21 ,665 , 077 5 . 4 2 1. 5
I mport Co mme r cp
1970 TH , ().'j 7 ,2 9 (1 186 ,159 ,5ll0 22,005 ,84 11 6 .8 1 1. 8
1 ~J 7 1 J J 7 ,OJ 5 ,O OO 185 ,20 J. 000 20,;20 , JlO 6 .1 11. 2
I 'll? '17 ." ,909 , 300 20J , 462 ,50 0 2 0 , ~1 9 9 , JOt) 3 . 6 10 . 'I
197 ') ·'1 6 1 , 10 1 , 0 0 0 2110,627 ,300 :?!l, 23 0,277 5 . 3 10 . 1
I 'J7 !i !, 6 8 . :14 8 , 50 0 22,) ,762 ,500 28 ,110 , J60 6 . 0 12. (i
10 7 5 !i 31 , 12 2 , 30 0 196 , 107 , 000 22 ,:I72 ,27J 3 . 0 11 . 4
1976 538 ,171 , 000 198 ,225 ,500 19,631 ,22 ) J . 7 9 . 9
1977 626 ,26:, , 0 0 0 202 ,')09 ,000 16 ,)68 ,52.'t 2 .6 8 . 1
19,8 61l1 ,b5J ,l)OO 18 9, 56 4 , 5 0 0 lC),184 ,697 '1 .2 10 . 1
l LJ 7 9 6 0 J , .'32 9 , 1) 1)0 18 J , ()<)5 , 000 20 ,JJ8 ,5 70 ') .4 II . 1
l l)Ml) '1<)5,)76 ,500 1'5 1 ,'329 ,500 15 , 221,7 9 9 J .l 10 .1
Tota l Fo r eig n Co mme r ce
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19 7()
1971
1972
197 '1
1 97 1,
1975
19 76
1 977
lq7 8
1 9 '79
1980
56 2 ,37 9 , ')LI!'
::> '12 , 2l)9 , 500
b 06 , Jl 1, 000
7 ')6 .81;9 .30 0
7 ').'t , 879 ,650
721 ,999 , 0 00
8 2 2 , 8 5 7 , 0 0 0
9 02 , 07.3, 0 00
90),226, 000
Y6J , 1)8 , ) 0 0
898 , 70 2 , 500
2 58 , 8 1 6 , 50 0
2J8 , 68 5,500
259 ,6.36 ,500
J O') .02 1 . 500
2 97 , 7 4 4 , 000
2 68, 064 ,00 0
268 ,027 . 000
260 ,J74 , 0 0 0
241 , lJ9 ,500
261 ,62 .'1, 0 0 0
252 , OJ O, 000
J l ,:l 90 , 9 2 2
2 7, 1 9 6 , 0 8 8
2 9 ,175 ,6:,6
) 4 , 57 1 . 9 6 7
4 u , 9 8 6 , 6 CH
)6 ,241 ,09 ')
J.'t ,595 ,S27
)0 , 408 , 0 8 5
) J,52),875
)8 , 528,516
)6, 896 ,876
5 .6
5 · 0
II, 8
~ l . 7
5 .6
5 . 0
4 .2
J .4
J . 7
4 .0
4 .1
12 . 1
1 1 . I ,
1 1.2
11 . ...
1) .8
0 . :>
12 · 9
1l.7
l ) . 9
1 4 .7
1!t .6
Source: Foreign Commerce Statistical Report (1979)
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Imports dropped to 16.1 million from 20.3 million in 1979, a
drop of 21 percent. (See Table 2.) Nevertheless, Baltimore
rated sixth in tonnage and third in value of total foreign
waterborne commerce in the u.S.
By examining the figures in Table 3, the proximity of Balti-
more to her inland markets is quickly seen. While certain
rates for cargo movements to the North Atlantic Range (NAR)
ports have been equalized, the majority of container and bulk
coal rates are distance sensitive. It should be mentioned
that while rates are a large factor in shipper preferences,
there are other factors that can affect his decision. Some
of these are frequency of service, port facilities, and labor
productivity. 10 The distance factor is translated directly
into savings with the smaller piggyback service (1-3 con-
tainers). This service is from ramp to ramp only and is the
major part of container movements at this time. In Table 4,
one can see the savings are substantial on a TOFC/COFC move-
ment between say Baltimore and East St. Louis, a major con-
tainer consolidation point. The savings on two containers
shipped together is $225 per movement. Add to this the port
fees in New York for labor-wage guarantees and the difference
is substantial. Recently (March 23, 1981), the ICC deregulated
the TOFC/COFC rail rates in the u.S. As of April 8, 1981)the
rates had dropped $126. Again)this will favor Baltimore as
shippers can no~ charge for the distance involved. One final
note on the distance to the industrial hinterland concerns
the 24 hour delivery radius for railroads and trucks from
15
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TABLE 4
Plan lIt Container Rates
Plan lIt rat es apply to a ramp-to-ramp service and involve th e use of railroad
e q u i p me n t . These rates also apply to steamship line containers when the
railroad and the steamship line have a working Equipment Int erchange Agreement.
Charges
(2 Trailers) (1 Trailer)
80,000 1bs. l~O,OOO Lb s ,
Excess Ex c e s s
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. l~
Between: $ Cw t , $ Cw t ,
--
Baltimore Chicago, IL 1208 1.72 760 2.08
New York " 1362 1. 94 85l~ 2.29
Norfolk " 1476 1. 9L~ 911 2.30
Phi1a. " 1249 1. 80 78L~ 2.18
Baltimore Cincinnati, OIl 918 1.33 576 1. 62
New York " 1117 1. 62 703 1 • 9L~
Norfolk " 1106 1. 49 68J 1. 72
Phila. " 1002 1.41 632 1. 72
Baltimore E.St. Louis,IL 1J46 1.90 8 LI9 2.32
New York " 1571 2.22 986 2.72
Norfolk " 1575 2.10 98l~ 2.57
Phila. " 1 L~ L~ 6 2.05 9lL~ 2. 5l~
Baltimore Indpls, IN 1012 1. 41 63L~ 1. 73
New York " 1234 1. 73 772 2.10
Norfolk II 1297 1. 71 801 2.05
Phila. " 1117 1. 62 703 1. 9l~
Baltimore Louisville, KY 1042 1. L~ 7 652 1. 81
New York " 1286 1. 87 807 2.22
Norfolk " 1242 1. 62 76 l! 1. 98
Phi1a. " 1168 1. 67 736 2.01
Advantages Using
Baltimore
80,000 1bs. -
40,000 1bs.
Col. 5 Col. 6
$ $
15L~ 94
268 151
41 24
199 127
188 107
84 56
225 137
229 135
100 ~ 65
222 138
285 167
105 69
......
2l~ L~ 155 m
200 112
126 8LI
TABLE 4 (Continued)
Betwe en: $ Cwt , $ Cw t , $ $
Baltimore Peoria, II. 11119 1. 89 877 2.23
New York II 1602 2.10 1001 2.62 183 12q
Norfolk II ll~59 2.08 921 2.57 110 11 11
Phila. " lq96 1. 99 926 2. 113 77 q9
Note: Columns 1,3,5,6 in dollars per unit - Columns 2,q in cents per hundred. Freight
charges include Ex Parte 375 Effective April 1, 1980.
Railroads serving the Port of Baltimore are the Chessie System (8&)), Consolidated
Rail Corp. (Conrail) and the Western Maryland (WM), part of the Chessie System, via
Interline Servic e with the Norfolk & Western (N&W).
Th e availability of volume rates applying on three twenty foot containers, ten or
more containers, and annual volume contract rat es further e n h a n ce your transportation
flexibility and economic advantages by shipping through the Port of Baltimore.
SOUHCE: Traffic Reporter, Maryland Port Administration, May, 1980.
t--'
.....j
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Baltimore. Via rail, general cargo can reach 43.7 percent of
the U.S. industrial market or 36.6 percent of the U.S. popu-
lation. Via truck) the cargo could find 37.1 percent of the
S . d t . 1 k t d 31 4 t f h S l' 11U.. ln us rla mar e an . percen 0 t e U.. popu atlon.
Needless to say, with the energy "crisis" and transportation
costs rising) the Port of Baltimore must surely look better and
better to interior shippers and markets.
When one looks at the port, the surrounding city, and the
state, the socioeconomic impact is enormous. The Port of
Baltimore, beyond the taxes it pays, generates one out of
every ten jobs in Maryland and $1 out of every $9.89 earned
in the state. 1 2 Table 5 shows the individual impacts of the
different port activities. Some general figures show that each
automobile generates roughly $74.64 in economic activity. Each
container generates $257.00 and each ton of bulk cargo gener-
ates $11.79, including direct and indirect impacts. From these
figures and tonnage figures for the port, one can easily see
why a reduction in cargo movements in Baltimore or any port is
a serious problem; be it loss of jobs or shipper confidence in
the port's ability to attract carriers.
A more detailed breakdown of container traffic is found
in Table 6 which shows which variables were used to find the
economic impact per container, per acre, and per ton of cargo.
On the same table the impact per ton of container is shown
for truck versus railroad (6A). This figure will change as
more and more bulk cargo (coal) moves through the port on unit
trains. The third part (6B) of the same table shows the
TABLE 5
Tota l I n duced and Dire c t I mpact s a n d Fina l I mpac ts p er
Ton, Port o~ Bal timo r e, 1 ° 7 3
Direct I mp a cts Toe al Dire c t
Al l Es "C i - and I n d uc ed Impa c t s
Ge ne ra l Bulk mat e d Ge ne r a l Al l bulk Al l
Por t-Rela t e d Ca rgo Ca r g o e s ~Iu lt i - Ca r g o Cargoes Ca rgoes
Act i v it i es (·30 0 0 ) (s ooo ) plier* ( $0 00) (3 0 00) (s OOO)
Ve ss e l Di s burs ements
S e rv ices 12, 64 .5 6, 08 .3 1. 78 22 ,508 10, 8 31 3J , 33 9
Gove r n me nt
Re quire ment s 801 640 1. 8 5 1, 482 1.184 2, 6 6 6
Lo a ding, d i scha rgi ng 83 ,984 7 .397 1. 7 1 14 3, 61 3 12, 64 9 1 5 6 , 26 2
Su p p l i es 2, 87 8 4 ,40 9 1. 78 5, 1 23 7, 84 8 12, 9 71
Bunkering 14, 2 9 6 5 , 79 3 0.85 12,152 4 ,9 24 17, 0 7 6
Cre \v Expe ndit u res 3 ,7)2 1 , 1105 2 .01 7 ,501 2 ,824 10, 32 5
Surface Tra n sporta t io n 44, 30 0 1 6 3, 473 1. 78 7 8 , 85!.j 2 90, 982 36 9 , 836
I n sura n ce & Ba nking 4 ,4 0 0 3, 11ft) 1. 8 5 8 , 14 0 5 ,809 13 , 94 9
Por t Se rvices 18,710 53 ,730 1. 71 31 ,994 9 1 . 8 7 8 12 J ,87 2
TOTALS ( $0 0 0 ) 185, 74 6 2 L~ 6 , 0 7 2 311 ,3 6 7 428,9 2 9 740 ,2 96
To n nages ( 0 0 0 ) 5, 5 6 9 J7 ,980 5 ,569 37 , 9 8 0 4 ), 84 9
Source: The Economic Impact of the Port of Baltimore on
Maryland; University of Maryland, April-1975.
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TABLE 6
Total Direct Impacts, Container Traffic,
Port of Baltimore, 1973
Vessel disbursements
Crew Expenditures
Port Services
Surface transportation
Insurance and Banking
TOTAL
Total Impact
($000)
17,273
lf45
29,690
13,080
2,291
$62,779
Impact
Per Ton*
(S/ton)
5.96
0.15
10.24
~.51
0.79
$21.65
Impact per
Container**
(~/unit)
70.92
1. 79
121.86
53.67
9.40
.32 57 . 64
Average alloted to containers at Dundalk Marine Terminal in
1973: 101
Impact per acre: $621,570
*Total container tonnage, 1973:
**Average weight per container,
2,900,000
1973: 11.9 tons
Ton~age
(millions)
TABLE 6A
Surface Transportation Impact,
Port of Baltimore,
Impact
(S millions)
Conra~nsr Traffic
10""':1
..... J • j
Impact
per Ton
(S/ton)
Railroad Carriage
Truck Carriage
All Modes
$4.97
8.11
13.08
TABLE 6B
1.4 S3·55
5.41
1.1. 51
Railroad Impact By Category of Traffic,
Port of Baltimore, 1973
Categorv
General Cargo
Bulk Transshipped
Railroad
Impact
(SOOO)
16,258
25,)46
Railroad
Tonnage (000)
3,803
10,05.5
Impact
Per Ton
(~:jton)
!.t.28
Source: The Economic Impact of the Port of Baltimore on
Maryland; University of Maryland, April - 1975.
21
difference in general cargo versus bulk cargo in the railroad's
impact on the port. The more intensive labor handling of gen-
eral cargo brings the larger impact. It should be noted that
in 1973 only 40 percent of all general cargo was container~ e
It is also interesting to note that the railroad had a smaller
impact than the trucking industry for the same amount of con-
tainer traffic. This perhaps could be said to show the econo-
mies of scale in rail movements.
In the area of foreign trade flows, some interesting trends
have developed recently. For the first time in over ten years,
the import of foreign commerce has lagged behind the export. 1 3
This was due to drops in petroleum imports and iron ore for
steel production. Add to this the large coal export increase,
and the role of the port as an export collector. Baltimore's
increasing role as a major port of commerce is shown in
Table 7 which shows that Baltimore's total foreign commerce
has been increasing steadily, both in percent of total U.S.
and percent of North Atlantic ports. Baltimore's share of
the North Atlantic port's total tonnage has been increasing
while Philadelphia's and New York's have been dropping. It
is only because of import cutbacks that Baltimore did not
have a record year for 1980. General cargo has been increas-
ing steadily since 1970 due primarily to container movements
through the port and the aggressive general cargo market build-
ing by the Port of Baltimore.
The major trading countries for the Port of Baltimore are
shown in Tables 8 and 9. These show that the major trade
TABLE 7
Relative Size of North Atlanti c Ports
Number of Vessels and Total Tonnage per Port as Perc ent of Total N.A. Ports
1975 1976 1977 1978 1:.212.
Tonnage
No. V~ (1000's)
Total U.S. 102, L~60 718,355 107, 5L~9 805,472 110,316 869,889 102,793 903,170 105,930 994,882
To tal N.. A .P.'s 24,352 230,734 23,728 263,128 21,626 226,874 19,137 225,226 19,104 238,028
%of total
26.1% 24.9%U.S. 32.0% 32.7% 23.9%
New York 7,465 71,784 7,170 74,101 6,773 74,723 6,702 74,356 6,288 67,348
% of N.A.P. 30.8% 28.1% 32.9% 32.9% 28.3%
Philadelphia 2,068 29,175 1,648 24,719 1,502 26,381 1,555 28,658 1,462 28,1+23
% of N.A.P. 12.6% 9. 4% 11.6% 12.7% 11.9%
Baltimore 2,606 26,019 2,437 25,147 2,243 23,771 2,512 28,177 2,435 32,689
% of N.A.P. 11.3% 9.5% 10. L,% 12.5% 13.7%
Norfolk 2,312 31,599 2, ll 2 4 33,618 2,058 29,392 1,729 21,576 2,238 32,429
% of N.A.P. 13.5% 12.7% 12.8% 9.5% 13.6%
Tons shown are net tons of 100 cubic feet carrying capacity of vessels and do not r epres ent
the actual weight of cargo carri ed.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce. U.S. Foreign Trad e 1975-1979 Annual Reports.
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TABL E 8
Distribution of Export Cargo Shipped from the Port of Baltimore
Arranged by Principal Countries of Destination
in ord er of Tonnage
1 980
Country of Destination
Japan
France
Belgium and Luxemborg
Sp a i n
Uni t ed Kingdom
I taly
Netherlands
Wes t Germany
Rumania
Gr e e c e
Shor t T ons
4,465,876
2,171,503
1,608,50 LI
1,512, 201
1,117, 393
920, 6 38
836, 067
798,7 93
75 0,199
750,1 99
Country of Destination
Sa u d i Arabia
Japan
\-J es t Germany
Uni t ed Kingdom
Belgium and Luxemborg
Fran ce
Spa i n
I t aly
Ne therlands
Republic of South Africa
Value
8 38, 98 9, LI LI 9
6 09 ,69LI ,060
559,807,8 35
524,3 60,792
518, 0 85,102
437, 087,184
398, 017, 051
353,7 64, 986
330,273,793
326,7 LI 3, 9 9 9
TRADE AREA
Ex p ort By Trad e Areas
SHORT TONS VALUE
Eu ro pe
Asia
South America
Africa
Nor th America
Au s t ralia and Oc eania
Un i de n t i f ied Trad e
Areas
1980
13,494,552
6,100,677
763,357
1,072,490
186,3 l14
28,557
19,101
197 9
10 , 73 0 , 8LI 8
5,830,2 27
908 , LI 8LI
5 LI LI , LI 56
125, 828
27 ,86 1
22, 242
1980
4,167,691,812
2, 934,801,638
9 23 , 60 7 , 74 2
840,412,190
85,273,110
91 , 7 1 3 , 88 3
1979
3,743,48L~, 3 05
2,379,503,201
751,552,659
450, L~7 2,731
47,873,21 2
75,93 2, 063
llL~,831
N
W
Source: Foreign Commerce Statistical Report (1979)
Maryland Department of Transportation
TABLE 9
Import Trad e of the Port of Baltimore Arranged by Principal Co u n t r i e s
o f Or i g i n in order of Ton n a ge
1980
Co u nt r y o f Origin
Canada
Vene zuela
Alg eria
Brazil
Ne therlands Antill es
Japan
Aus t r a lia
Trinidad and Tobago
\\Test Ge rm any
Republi c o f So ut h Africa
Sh o rt To n s
4 ,912 , 185
3 ,050 , 152
966 , 558
809, 59 6
682 ,060
549 , 75 4
502,699
290 ,207
271,824
240 , 601
Cou nt r y o f Drigin
J apan
''' est Germany
Un ited Kingdom
Franc e
Vene quel a
Italy
Brazil
Norway
Cana da
Swed en
Value
1, 535, 204,457
987,17 7,197
358 ,281 , 385
281 , 718 , 593
290 , 8 21+ , 345
277 ,4 95 , 090
243 ,340 , 890
18 2, 302,702
161,640,607
12 9,293,926
TRADE AREA
I mp o r t By TrRd e Areas
SHORT T ONS VALUE
Nort h Ameri c a
South Am eri c a
Europ e
Afri c a
Asia
Australia and Oce a n i a
1980
6,505,418
4, 423, 455
1,275,826
1,1-1-32,216
,-. 6' ~1,000, 4U
524,21+ 4
1979
7,957, 475
4 , 688 , 126
1,837,893
4 , 416 , 985
1,025,536
412,555
1980
462 , 19 7 , 594
653 ,058 , 782
2 , 74 7 ,616 , 504
25 3, 026,022
2 ,019 , 101 , 751
11 0, 382,262
197 9
373 ,055 ,244
51 0,585,857
2,58 9, 667,759
240, 860, 94 2
1,509,550, 931
90, 252,874
Source: Foreign Commerce Statistical Report (1979)
Maryland Department of Transportation
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areas for export are Europe and East Asia. Baltimore maintains
Europe as her major partner while, in general, the u.s. - Far
East trade has surpassed the European trade, especially in the
container market. An interesting note is how technology can
change the value of exports. Saudi Arabia is nineteenth on
the export tonnage list but number one on the export value list.
As far as imports are concerned, the tonnage leader is Canada
with the metallic ores, while Japan leads the value category
with autos and electronics. Again the European flow has been
suffering while the Asian and Australian trade flows have been
growing at a phenomenal rate, even with declining imports.
Another interesting statistic is the decline of African import
tonnage by 3 million tons and the increase in total value by 5
percent despite a decrease in tonnage.
These basic facts show that Baltimore is growing in a geo-
graphical area that is generally losing cargo to other coasts.
Containerized general cargo is growing despite the import
slowdown. However, there are a few danger signals on the
horizon as far as the rail/port interface is concerned. In
the next section /we will deal with this growing problem of
crosscountry movements and the enormous switch to truck
transport.
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III. CONTAINER MOVEMENTS
In this section, the container portion of Baltimore's gen-
eral cargo movements will be examined. By looking at the
large growth in container traffic and the changing container
hinterland, the importance of the container traffic to the
Port of Baltimore will be shown. Following this )there will be
a discussion of the truck versus the rail inland transporta-
tion problem. Trucking handles 82 percent of all containers
moving through the Port of Baltimore. In this paper, almost
all container statistics come from the Dundalk Marine Termi-
nal. While the terminal does not handle all the port's con-
tainers, it handles over 60 percent of the traffic and com-
piles the most comprehensive records available. In the first
full year of operation, the terminal handled 68,071 containers,
but by 1980 the terminal handled 245,977, an increase of 261.4
percent.
Some interesting trends in Dundalk's container business are
the import/export imbalances. (See Table 10.) Exports have
always exceeded imports in tonnage and loaded containers moved.
This varies from the total cargo tonnage pattern for the port
which favored imports over exports until 1980. Another interest-
ing statistical flow is the amount of empty containers return-
ing to Baltimore as inbound containers. This a margin of three
or four to one over empty export containers. On the export
TABLE 10
Dundalk Container Statistics
1971 Through 1980
l2ll 1972 illJ. llE .!21...2.
IMPORT
Empty Containers 5,69J 14,7J6 21,629 17,517 29,769
Loaded Containers 78,12J J8,126 58,75J 66,929 64,170
Cargo Tonnage J86,696 511,866 779,J96 971,16J 884,6J6
EXPORT
Empty Containers 2,946 4,056 6,3J5 7,185 9,429
Loaded Containers Jl,J09 49,167 76,946 82,J80 92,958
Cargo Tonnage 490,597 714,289 1,lJO,617 1,256,905 1,J90,570
rOTAL IMPORT/EXPORT
Empty Containers 8,6J9 18,792 27,964 24,702 J9,198
Loaded Containers 59,4J2 87,29J IJ5,699 149,J09 157,128
Cargo Tonnage 877,29J 1,226,155 1,910,01J 2,228,068 2,275,206
Vessels 47J 709 909 986 1,07J
Total Containers 68,071 106,085 16J,662 176,011 196,J26
Total Tonnage 877,29J 1,226,155 1,910,01J 2,228,068 2,275,206
Avg. Tonnage Per
Loaded Container 14.8 14.0 14.1 15.0 14.5
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
D1PORT
Empey Containers JO,080 26,819 JJ,689 J2,11J 46,908
Loaded Containers 67,764 65,946 85,416 8J,724 70,J51
Ca r g o Tonnage 95J,421 957,725 1,255,975 1,211,499 990,786
EXPORT
Empey Containers 11,059 9,J70 11,227 9,526 5, 016
Loaded Containers 91,2)8 86,27J 114,994 118,102 123,702
Cargo Tonnage 1,412,517 1,JJJ,216 1,721,126 1,757,J58 1,856,3J5
TOTAL DIPORT/EXPORT
Empty Coneainers 41,lJ9 J6,189 44,916 41,6J9 51,924
Loaded Coneainers 159,012 152,219 200,410 201,826 194,05J
Cargo Tonnage 2,J65,9J8 2,290,941 2,947,101 2,968,857 2,847,121
Vessels 1,147 1,104 1,401 1,2JO 1,216
Total Containers 200,151 188,408 245,J26 24J,465 245,977
Total Tonnage 2,J65,9J8 2,290,941 2,947,101 2,968,857 2,847,121
Avg. Tonnage Per
Loaded Container 14.9 15.1 14.7 14.7 14.7
Source: Dundalk Marine Tenninal
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side of container movements, loaded containers were far ahead
of empties by a margin of twenty to one in 1980. Yet in the
import flow, the loaded containers were less than twice the
number of empty containers. The fact that Dundalk Terminal
exported 128,718 containers and imported only 117,259 contain-
ers in the same year means that Dundalk must be supplied by
another port or the containers are being transshipped in
Baltimore from another terminal. This transportation of intra-
port containers brings problems and extra cost.
The hinterlands for the import/export markets are as im-
portant as the number of containers moving through the port.
These hinterlands determine which manufacturing areas the
port can draw on in attempting to increase its traffic. As
the distance from a port grows, the attraction of other ports
becomes stronger. Within a one-hundred mile radius, Baltimore
has a population concentration of 9.2 million people, New
York has 26.2 million and Hampton Roads has 4.3. 1 4 Hence,
one can see the relative advantages each port has in reaching
large local markets. The commodity being shipped, the fact
that it's an import or export, even the time of year, all make
a large difference in the areas that a port considers a true
hinterland. Figure 1 shows two hinterlands, one inside the
other. The local hinterland is basically Maryland, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The local market area is the area
that has the heaviest impacts upon the port. The hinterland
area is affected by the distance factor away from Baltimore
and the rates involved. As one moves toward Chicago, the
PORT OF BALTIMORE GENERAL CAR G0 MARK E T AREAS
FIGURE 1
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SOURCE : A Market Pr ofi le of the Port of Baltimore :
(Published 1 9 8 0 )
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Gulf and South Atlantic ports become more competitive with
Baltimore. This will be discussed in relation to the following
figures 2 and 3.
In the following container markets discussion, the local
and hinterland markets, as seen in Figure 1, will be the area
that will be dealt with in regard to comparing the different
states and traffic flows. Because the numbers for individual
container flows were not available for imports at this writ-
ing, the tonnage per state was used in the import comparisons.
As shown in Table 12 (export container movements), the tonnage
figures generally follow the container movements within rea-
sonable limits. In the export container market figures, we
see a developing bias toward local market predominance. From
the Patton study, we see that in 1955 the Midwest market held
an even balance with the local market. Both were roughly 45
percent. However by 1980, the markets had diverged and the
local market now controls 59.6 percent of the container move-
ments. The Midwest market only influeces 31.2 percent. This
could be due to the emergence of the truck as the major con-
tainer carrier on the inland legs.
In container imports (Table 13), the Midwest market has
traditionally lagged behind the local market. In 1955, the
percents were 34.2 percent for the Midwest versus 52.7 per-
cent local, or roughly an 18 percent difference. In 1976,
the Midwest market was 29.1 percent and the local market was
44.8 percent, roughly a 16 percent difference. So again we
TABLE 12
EXPORT CARGO FLOWS - PORT OF BALTIMORE
1955 1976 1980**
---
% of % of % of % S ta te Expts % Exports* % of % Export
State Carloads Total 'l'onnaqe (Containers) Total Total Through Carried Containers Total Carried
Baltimore Rail Truck Rail Truck
86 2.9 54,055 (4,719 ) 6.8 ( 8) 84 5,075 7 57 44Illinois (ILL) 19 9
Indiana (IN) 122 4.0 20,569 (1,936 ) 2.6 (3) 17 51 49 2,316 3 59 41
Kentucky(KY) 38 1.3 21,105 (1,021) 2.6 ( 2) 20 82 18 1,783 2 66 34
(MI) 113 3.8 40,756 (2,264) 5.2 (4 ) 24 52 41 3,206 4 43 57
(OH) 771 25.8 89,935 (6.850) 11. 4 (11) 39 70 30 8,106 11 32 68
(WV) 189 6.3 19,723 (1,704 ) 2.5 ( 3) 56 41 59 2,402 3 11 89
(WS) 49 1.6 38,507 ( 337) 4.9 (1) 26 91 9 576 1 31 69
TOTAL MIDWEST 1368 45.7 284,650 (l8,831) 36.1 (32.2) 70 28 23,518 31. 2 42 58
(MD) 479 16.0 262,570 (18,693) 33.3 (31) 90 6 89 23,249 31 8 92
721 24.0 105,908 (12,206) 13.4 (20) 3 19 2 98 ---- - -(PA) 21 94 14,302
(VA) 99 3.3 31,621 (3,493) 4.0 (6) 13 - 100 6,488 9 1 99
2 6,387 (564) .8 (1) 1 -- - - -(DL) - 31 - 100 658 -
-- - -
(DC) 44 1.5 - (121) - (-) - - - 263 - - -
TOTAL LOCAL 1345 44.9 406,486 (35,077) 51. 5 (60.0) - 5 91 44,960 59.6 5 95
---- - -
ALL OTHERS 281 9 98,079 (4,522) 12.4 ( 8) - 10 1 6,993 9.0 9 91
OVERALL TOTAL 2994 789,215 (58,430) 32 62 75,471 18 82
- - --
*Percents will not total 100 as other modes were used.
**Statistics from Dundal~ Marine Terminal through October only.
Note: 1) In 1979 total container movements for hinterland and local were 90,523 or 70.9% of POB's
total export container movement (127,628).
2) 1955 Study uses carloads instead of containers
3) 1980 Figures are through October of 1980.
Source: 1) Maryland Port Administration, Department of Marketing and Statistics - Marketing Surv ey for
POB-1980.
2) Patton article.
W
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see the immediate hinterlands of Baltimore as being extremely
important both as an export and import hinterland. One fur-
ther interesting point is the growing "all others" category in
the import range. A much larger hinterland has developed
for the cargo from Baltimore. In 1955, this "all others" cate-
gory was 12.2 percent, but by 1976 it had grown to 19.9 per-
cent. Looking at the two maps (Figures 2 and 3) from the
Patton article, one quickly sees the relative size of the im-
port versus export hinterlands, the export being larger. This
was primarily due to the large manufacturing shipments coming
from the Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin area, and the fact that the
general cargo markets had generally favored exports (until
1970). In 1955, there were 1,147 carloads of import versus
2,994 carloads of export. Advancing to today's general cargo
markets, one sees that exports outpaced imports in 1980.
Strangely enough, general cargo imports were outpaced by gen-
eral cargo exports in 1970, the last time until 1980. Contain-
ers have always maintained an export over import balance
through every year of operation, right through 1980. (See
Table 10.)
From a recent port survey (1976 figures) of the Baltimore
market area, covering both the Midwest hinterland and the local
market area, some interesting figures are available. (See
Table 14.) In the total Port of Baltimore container market
area, exports and imports were even. Imports in 1976 totalled
2,201,156 versus 2,147,260 for the export movements. Baltimore
handled 32 percent of its total container hinterland's exports
33
TABLE 13
PORT OF BALTIMORE
Import Flows of Container Cargoes 1976 and 1955
1976 1976 (1980) 195 5
% State Impts
State Tonnage % of Through % Tonnage Carried
Total Baltimore Rail Truck Carloa ds ~, of To t a l
IL 36,440 5.9 7 49 ( 5l( 26 2. 3
IN 39,736 6.4 36 8l( 19 ( 22 1.9
KY 22,287 3.6 24 62 ( 38 ( 6 . 52
MI 35,510 5.7 11 4l( 59 ( 78 6.8
OH 93,296 15.0 28 45 ( 52 ( 223 19.4
vN 13,165 2.1 73 18 ( 82 ( 34 2.9
viS 5,766 0.9 8 - ( 100 ( 3 .26
TOTAL
MID>vEST 246,200 39.6 50 ( 49 ( 392 34.2
MD 115,026 18.5 67 ** ( 89 ( 261 22.7
PA 83,146 13.4 18 3 ( 80 ( 275 23.9
VA 17,858 2.9 12 ** ( 78 ( 58 5. 0
DL 10,733 1.7 42 - ( 100 ( 5 .43
DC 24,945 4.0 81 - ( lOOt 16 1.4
TOTAL
LOCAL 251,708 40.5 l( 87 ( 615 53.6
ALL
OTHERS 123,691 19.9 37 ( 63 ( 140 12.2
OVERALL
TOTAL 621,599 23 ( 67 ( 1147
NOTE: -1) In 1979 the Total Tonnage for the hinterland and local markets wa s 80.1% of the POS's
total import container traffic. 2) 1976 figures are container tonnage only. 3) 1 0 ~-~~:l
is all general cargo through Baltimore by rail carload for the month of .Juri e only.
June was selected as a representative month. There are no container figures for
1976 or 1980 in imports.
Note 2) 1980 figures are in the mail.
**Other modes involved.
This comparison is merely to show change in markets and traffic flows. It does not
guarantee absolute accuracy in actual numbers, nor is it a comparison of boxcars to
containers to general cargo. Whereas most general cargo in 1955 traveled by boxcar,
today's general cargo generally travels by container.
Source: 1) Maryland Statewide Goods Movement Study. Pg. B-l(4/6).
2) Patton (see Footnotes) .
3) Market Study (see Footnotes) .
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TABLE 14
Comparison of Baltimore and th e Total Market Area
for Container Mov ement s
Total Import Containers for
Port of Baltimore Total Market
Area Port of Baltimore
Tonnage Percent Tonnage Percent
Local 832,163
Hinterland 1,368,991
TOTAL 2,201,156
251,708
246,200
497,908
50.6%
l~ 9 . 4%
Baltimore h~ndles 23% of her total hinterland imports.
Total Export Containers for
Port of Baltimore Total Market
Ar-ea Port of Baltimore
Tonnage
Local 1, 051,825
Hinterland 1,095,435
Percent
48.9%
51.1~~
Tonnage
406,486
28l~,650
Percent
38.8%
41.2';%>
TOTAL 2,147. 2 6 0 691,136
Baltimore handles 32% of her total hinterland exports.
Note: Total Market means Midwest Hinterland plus local market
area.
SOG"RCE: A Market Profile of the Port of Baltimore 1970 and
1976, James Hobson. See footnote Tables III-A,
III-K.
and 23 percent of its container imports.
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In a reverse of the
Port's own biases which had a balanced import hinterland and
a skewed export hinterland, the market area figures show just
the opposite. The report data for the total area show that the
hinterland had a considerable edge over the local traffic. Yet
in the export market there was a balance which did not exist
before at the port. As the competition increases for the hin-
terland markets, one can expect Baltimore to compete and be-
come more influential in her local area. One point to be made
is that the huge impact of New York on the Baltimore local
area had only been overcome by 1976. Up until that point, New
York was stronger in both local and hinterland markets in both
import and export container traffic.
Basically this shows that Baltimore is unique in the North
Atlantic market it serves. The rest of her hinterland does
not place as much emphasis on the local container traffic for
exports as Baltimore, and they weigh heavily on the hinterland
shipments of imports. However;while Baltimore may seem unique
in her hinterland markets, the Port of New York has found
similar experiences in her market and the below excerpt gives
some explanations.
The geographic area served by the port is subject to
different degrees of competition from other ports.
It appears that, with the exceptions of certain bulk
commodities such as grain a significant proportion of
the international commerce moving through a port is
local or decidedly regional in terms of origin and
destination. For example, the 1970 special census of
domestic origin and destination of general cargo ex-
ports and imports indicated that for New York, the
38
largest port in North America in terms of the volume
of general commodity exports and imports, 58 percent
of the volume of exports and 68 percent of the im-
ports originated or terminated in the states of New
York and New Jersey. Additionally, 39 percent of the
exports and 58 percent of the imports originated or
terminated, respectively, within 25 miles of the port.
These figures indicate that while the New York-New
Jersey Port is an ocean gateway for high and low-
value import cargoes, the low-value commodities tend
to be delivered to areas close to the Port, where
transportation is relatively cheap, while the higher-
value commodities move both locally and to distant
destinations. 1 5
In Tables 15 and 16)we see the commodities most often
shipped via containers and the overseas destination and/or
origins. Baltimore's proximity to manufacturing centers is
borne out by the large number of manufactured products or
products used in industrial manufacturing. Strangely enough,
.- Baltimore imports many of the same commodities it exports.
Eight out of the ten commodities are exported in the container
trade. A general pattern of importing basic manufactured or
complete products and exporting components and products neces-
sary for manufacturing seems to emerge from the tables.
The second part of the table shows Europe and Central
America as the leading container export markets. Europe and
Japan are the leading importers of material to the Port of
Baltimore by a large margin (79%). By 1980, Japan (E. Asian
market) had overtaken the European container market (tonnage)
to the u.S. as a whole with the West Coast making stronger
gains than the East Coast.
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TABLE 15
Principal Commo di ty Mo vements Through
the Port of Baltimore - 1 976
(Ranked by Cargo Volume in Thousands o f Tons)
General Containerized Cargoes
8. 6
8. 4
5.0
4.2
2.8
2.7
IJ.7
14.5
1~ of
Total
Baltimore
Ex p o r t s
J9.7
J9.0
J2.8
JJ.7
22.2
21. 7
68.1
66.5
108.0
1976
Export s
Via
Baltimore
(000)
114.5
Commodity
Beve rages
Machinery, o t he r
than Elec t r i c
~onmetallic Mineral
Nf' t r s .
Iron and S te e l
Manufa ctures of
Y! e tal
Sy n t he t i c Resins,
Ce l l u l o se , Plasti cs
El ec t r Lc :-'!ach.,
Apparatus & Applianc es
Che mi c a l Products &
[vIa t erials
Te x t i le , Yarn, Fabrics,
Et c.
Fruits & Vegetables
Commodity
Fruits & Vegetables
Machinery, o t he r
than Ele c t r ic
Transport Equipment
Beverages
Manufa ctures of Metal
Iron and S't e e L
Rubb er Manufactures
~onmetallic Mineral
Mariu f a c tur e s
Chemical El ements &
Compounds
Furniture
1976
Imports
Via
Baltimore
(000)
IJO. Lj.
100.7
64.0
59.9
51. 5
51. J
19·9
1J.7
12.7
ob of
Total
Baltimore
Imports
2 1 .0
16.2
10. J
9 . 6
8.J
8.J
~l . 4
J.2
2.2
2.0
Source: Haryland Statewide Goods Movement study.
Simat et al., April, 1980.
TABLE 16
Principal \';orld Areas of' Origin or De s t i.na tion of No v e me n t s
Through the Port of Ba1 timon:' - 1976
(Ranked by Cargo Vol ume in Thou5and~ of Tons)
General Contai ne r i zed Cargoes
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Area
C . America
~ . Europe
S . Europe/Ned
E. Asia
S . Am erica
Area
~ . Europe
E . As i a
S . Eur o p e / :Vl e d
C . Am e r i c a
S . Americ a
1976
Exports
Vi a
Balt i more
(000 )
:340 .5
1''+8 .8
79 .1
62 .9
52 .8
1976
I mports
Via
Baltimore
(000)
23'1 .9
1 37. 1
92. 9
4J. l
J9 .J
~b of
Total
Ba ltimore
Ex ports
43 .1
18 .9
10 .0
8 .0
6 .7
?h o t '
Total
Ba ltimore
Import:-:,
J8 .J
2 3 .'3
15. 8
6 .9
6 .3
Source: Maryland Statewide Goods Movement Study.
Simat et al., April, 1980
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As mentioned earlier in this discussion, the competition
for the Midwest (HW) hinterland is growing sharper every year.
In Table 10 we see effects of this competition on the tradi-
tional Baltimore hinterland. In the table, we see that the
exports of the traditional hinterland states are more "loyal"
to the region than the imports, and that the local markets
show higher "loyalty" than the MW markets. On the whole, the
port region manages to control roughly 40 to 60 percent of
both imports and exports of its hinterland states. New York,
although losing some traffic to Baltimore every year, is still
the major competitor in the North Atlantic range. The biggest
competing port region for Baltimore is the Gulf and West Coast
ranges. Los Angeles and Seattle are the primary competing
ports with Seattle monopolizing the West Coast import container
market for Baltimore's hinterland. At this time, there are
still no well founded facts that show exactly what effect the
West Coast has had on the Port of Baltimore. In the Conasa
r
minibridge case one of the primary failings of the ports was
the inability to document their losses to the West Coast. For-
tunately for Baltimore, what evidence there was showed only
a minor impact.
Returning to the import/export Tables 12 and 13, we see
a general loyalty to Baltimore relying on distance from it
and the availability of an in state port. Virginia for in-
stance has Norfolk and hence imports only 12 percent of her
containers through Baltimore. Delaware uses Baltimore
heavily, accepting 42 percent of her container cargo imports
TABLE 17
Share of St a t e Ca rgo e s Moving Via Coa s t a l Port Regions
Ot her Than The North Atlantic
1976
Stat e
Share Moving Via
Ot h e r Port Regions
Containe r
EX HI
Principal Compe t i n g
Port Region
Conta i ne r
EX IM
Principal
Compet i n g Port
Con ta i ne r
EX IM
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Michigan
Ohio
IV. Virginia
Ivisconsin
Maryland
Pennsylvania
Virginia
Delaware
Dist. of Columbia
27 %
26
36
4
11
8
16
1
9
2
4 7%
27
4 1
17
21
27
30
1 0
9
26
14
GULF
\V EST
GULF
1{EST
1-lEST
1vEST
I-lEST
IvEST
,.,rEST
I-lEST
\V EST
SATL
IvEST
IvEST
IvEST
1-lEST
1vEST
IvEST
\vEST
1vEST
NOR
SFO
TPA
SFO
LAX
SF O
SEA
SFO
LAX
SEA
LAX
CRA
SEA
SEA
SEA
SEA
SEA
SEA
SEA
SEA
Po rt Regions co mp r i se d of: S. Atlanti c (SATL) = Ch a r le s t own (CHA), SAVANNAH (SAV)
8ULF = Tampa (TPA), New Or leans (NOR),
Houston (HOU)
Ives t Coast (1vEST) = Los Angeles (LAX), San Francisco ( SFO),
Po r tland (PDX), Se a t tl e ( SEA)
..,.
tv
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through the port. Michigan, being furthest away, uses the
port for 11 percent of the imports while West Virginia uses
Baltimore for 73 percent. Exports follow a similar but not as
an exaggerated pattern.
Hopefully in this first section, the reader can see that
containers are an increasing part of Baltimore's attempt to
create a balanced cargo pattern of bulk versus general cargo.
The idea that Baltimore's traditional hinterland area is chang-
ing is a very important point. Other ports are using frequency
of carrier visits, lower harbor costs, and better location to
Western markets to lure some of these traditional markets away.
But there is another factor that is creeping into this chang-
ing hinterland picture. This is the pattern of railroads leav-
ing the port area, either due to disinterest in the container
trade or due to competition from the unregulated trucking in-
dustry. The port cannot continue to allow the railroads to de-
part from the port infrastructure if the port is to remain
healthy. In this next section,we will examine this problem
and how pervasive it is becoming.
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IV. TRUCK v. RAIL IN CONTAINER MOVEMENTS
The problem of truck versus rail transportation can be
quickly brought to focus by looking at three performance
tables from the Maryland Port Administration at Dundalk Ma-
rine Terminal (DMT). Table 18 shows the 1976 through 1980
container movements via truck and rail. In 1980, the truck
sector carried 82 percent of all DMT's containers. In the
preceding years, this total remained around 70 percent. The
percent in Illinois has dropped from 92 to 57 for rail in
just three years and this is for a state roughly 800 miles
from Baltimore. Traditionally, the rail's effectiveness has
been strongest after 300-400 miles but the figures in the
above table show that even in states such as Minnesota and
Missouri, the trucking industry has equalized or beaten any
rail advantages. The distance factor will be discussed
later in this section.
A second table, to examine this loss of rail strength, is
the TOFC/COFC operations in Table 19. Beginning in 1974,
the total export/import total for Trailer on Flat Car/Con-
tainer on Flat Car (TOFC/COFC) was 35,087 movements. Since
1974, there has been a steady decline to 12,022 movements in
1980. This is a decline of 65 percent in only six years.
One has only to place the figures for total container move-
ments in Dundalk underneath the totals for TOFC/COFC and one
sees an equally sharp ascent. TOFC/COFC movements are
Tabl e I~ (Continue d)
State Hode 1976 1977 1978 1 97 9 1 980
Michigan Rail 1,9J O 85% 2,012 8J% 4, 0 64 8 2% 2 ,678 66% 1, 607 L~ J 96
Truck JJ4 15% 416 17% 904 18% h.l8 1 34% 2 , 178 57%
TOTAL 2 , 264 2, 4 28 4, 968 4, 059 3,785
Hinn eso t a Rail 23 34 % 27 60% 115 880£ L~37 91% 113 52%I
Tr uc k 44 66% 18 40%
-l2 1 20£ 4 2 9% 106 48%
6 7
I
L~79TOTAL 4 5 130 21 9
Nebras ka Rail 17 8 86% 2 19 70% 1 21 640£ 355 7 5~6 174 49%I
Truc k
-lQ 14% --2l 30% .sa. 36% 121 25% 183 51%
TOTAL 20 8 312 188 4 76 35 7
Oh io Rail 4 , 758 6 9% 4, 373 6496 7,11.j5 6 5% 6, 897 6 0% 3 , 13 7 32%
Tr uc k 2 , 092 J l% 2 ,h17 J6% J, 817 J5% 4 ,626 4 0% 6 ,652 68%
TOTAL 6 , 850 6,7 90 10, 962 11, 5 23 9 , 78 9
Pennsylvania Rail 1 23 1% IJI 1% 271 26£ 25 6 2% J04 2~I I
Tru ck 11,917 99% 12, 245 99 % 15, 474 98% 16,124 98% 15, 05 1 98%
TOTAL 1 2,040 12, 376 15,74 6 16, J80 15, J55
Tenness e e Rail 44 64% 24 2L~% 98 54% 216 71% 81 47%
Truck 2 78 84 88 91
TOTAL 69 102 182 304 17 4
Vir ginia Rail 66 J of 2 3 1% 56 1% 26 1% 44 10£/'0 /
Truck 2 , 161 97% 2, L~ 0 9 9996 1,716 99% 4, 038 9 90£ 5,084 99%
- /
TOTAL 2,22 7 2 , L~ J 2 J,77 2 4 ,064 5 , 128
Source: Dundalk Marine Terminal.
*'"Q)


Tabl e 18 (Continued)
Stat e Mode 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
\visconsin Rail 279 83~b 213 6006 273 66% 306 65 % 202 3 1%I
3 l!%Truck 58 17% 144 40% 138 166 35 % ~ 69%
TOTAL 337 357 411 472 660
West
Virginia Rail 536 31 % 265 16% 52 l! 25% 469 17% 310 11%
Truck 1,168 69% 1,365 84% 1,577 75% 2,241 83 % 2,443 89%
TOTAL 1,'704 1,630 2,101 2,710 2, 753
All Ot he r
States Rail 1,563 38% 1,261 33% 1,704 30% 948 14% 763 9%
Truck 2,573 62 % 2,567 67 % 3,922 70% 5,828 86 % 7,613 91%
TOTAL 4,136 3,828 5,626 6,776 8,376
Total Rail 16,702 29% 15,774 27% 29,518 36% 27,044 31% 15,259 18%
Total Truck 40,276 71 % 43,735 69% 52,724 6406 59,319 69 % 69,234 82%I I
GRAND TOTAL 56,978 59, 509 82,242 86,363 84,493
Dundalk Marine Terminal.
*'-
-...J
TABLE 19
Dundalk Ma rine Terminal
TOFC/COFC Operat ions
En d of Year Su mmaries - 1974 Thru 1980
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Ye a r 1 97 4 - Export Ye a r 1 975 - Export
Pe nn Ce ntra l 15, 004 Penn Ce ntra l 16, 28 9
Ch e s si e 4 , 4 9 5 Ch e s sie 8 1
TOTAL 19,4 99 TOTAL 16,37 0
Ye a r 1974 - I mpo r t Ye a r 1975 - I mpo r t
Penn Cen t r al 1 2,56 0 Penn Central 10,91 2
Ch ess ie 3 ,028 Ch e ss ie 10
T OTAL 15,588 T OTAL 10,9 22
To t al Exp/ I rnp 35 ,087 To t a l Exp/Imp 27 ,292
*ro t al Co nta i n ers 174, 011 To t al Co ntai n ers 1 96,3 26
Year 1976 - Ex p or t Ye a r 1977 - Exp o r t
Conrail 14,609 Conr ail 13,581
Che s sie 40 Ch e s si e 0
T OTAL 14,64 9 T OTAL 13,581
Ye a r 197 6 - Import Ye ar 1977 - Import
Co n ra i l 8 , 48 7 Conra i l 7,594
Ches si e 0 Ches s ie 0
TOTAL 8 , 48 7 TOTAL 7,594
To t a l Exp/ I mp 23 , 136 To t al Exp/Imp 21 , 175
To t al Con t aine r s 200,151 To t al Con t aine r s 188,40 8
Ye a r 1978 - Exp o r t Ye a r 197 9 - Ex po r t
Conrail 18,97 9 Co n r ail 1 2,649
Year 1978 - I mp o r t Ye a r 1978 - I mp o r t
Conr ail 9 , 7 78 Conr ail 9 , 454
Total Exp/Imp 28 , 75 7 To t al Exp/ I mp 22 , 103
To t al Containe rs 245 , 326 T o t a l Containers 243 ,Lr65
Ye a r 1 980 - Export
Conra i l
Year 1980 - Imp ort
Conra i l
Tota l Exp/ I rnp
Total Cont aine r s
*~otal for Port of Baltimore
Source: Dundalk Marine Terminal
7 , 483
4,539
12 , 022
245 , 977
49
entirely rail oriented, and their demise shows the drastic cut-
back in rail services to the port. It is also interesting to
note that the Chessie System has stopped servicing the DMT
since 1976. If Conrail can be termed a North-South rail system,
then Chessie might be termed an East-West route. "The Chessie
System (Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Western Maryland
Railway) has the most route miles within the state and provides
direct service to the largest geographic area." What this
basically means is that with no Chessie-DMT interaction the
Port of Baltimore is slowly cutting itself off from many East-
West container movements and markets. This also means that
the Chessie System, which is now an enormous collection of other
railroads and could provide extensive rail connections to the
West and Southeast, is not participating at DMT. It should be
mentioned that Chessie does service DMT but only via a barge or truck
service. One final table (20) shows the potential for TOFC/
COFC for the future of the Port of Baltimore. Noting the large
estimated increases for TOFC for the East/West movements and
noting the fact that Chessie is the main carrier for East/West
TOFC containers, it is very strange that Chessie is not con-
necting with Baltimore's largest container pier directly. An-
other important note is that TOFC has the highest projected
growth rate except for coal. It seems paradoxical that a dynamic
growing port could allow the terminal that carries 60 percent
of its container traffic to be served by only one carrier that
is losing business at a rapid rate. Obviously, there are
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problems and some of these will be discussed later. But as
this section is about truck versus rail a few general prin-
ciples are in order.
When cargo moves away from a port toward a hinterland
two factors decide how it will travel. time, distance and the
resultant cost. Some commodities must move quickly and there-
fore have a high intrinsic value. Fruit or electronic compo-
nents all are worth nothing when not at their market and in-
ventories are expensive. They will command higher rates be-
cause they have to move faster. Bulk items generally are not
as time sensitive, and are usually handled more cheaply when
carried in a large quantity. Containers make all items equal
in size, shape, and handling characteristics. The carrier is
the one who must move quickly to make his profit, especially
now that the rates have recently been deregulated and become
highly competitive. But returning to the shipper, the problem
lies as to which mode is cheaper or which mode gives the best
service, or transit time. Trucks by their very nature of be-
ing maneuverable and not restricted to tracks, have been col-
lecting major portions of the container market because they
are flexible and cheaper. However, there comes a point where
the fuel involved in moving just that one container begins to
weigh heavily. Railroads have traditionally been cheaper over
longer routes due to scale economics. Trucks have usually cap-
tured the shorter distance markets. Usually this division is
around 300 to 400 miles but will vary with the commodity and
the preferences of the shipper. In Table 21 there are a series
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of break-even points calculated for different commodities. These
break-even points are where the shipper will shift from truck
to rail. From this table it can be seen generally (with some
exceptions), bulk items prefer the railroad's savings in scale
o
economics with distance. Fresh vegetables can not wait long
in rail yards, hence they utilize trucking for longer distances
even if the cost becomes more than the rails'.
As mentioned before, break bulk or bulk are either non-
homogenous or require extensive loading and unloading methods.
Containers do not. Other than the extremely high cost of an
installation to handle the units, the operation is relatively
simple and less labor intensive. Containers can also carry a
variety of commodities so that a container of fruit may be on
the same train as a container of rugs. In order to see if
this affects the break-even point, a quick look at the follow-
ing figures are in order. The first figure 4 shows the import!
export truck-rail break-even point for containers in the U.S.
as a whole. It becomes readily apparent that trucks are the
clear winners up to the 200 to 349 mile category, at which
point rail becomes more practical. Exports break even sooner
than imports, but roughly in the same 100 miles. In both im-
port and export, the rail attractiveness seems to peak in the
500 to 749 category. It stays ahead of truck costs from the
break-even point on, with a few new peaks in rail in the 1000
to 1499 mile category. This merely points up rail's long dis-
tance cost effectiveness over trucks. Commodity does not make
any difference.
100%
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It is when we get to Baltimore's container traffic that the
uniqueness of its transportation market becomes apparent. In
Figure 5 ,we see the import and export rail-truck patterns from
25 to over 1500 miles. The truck preference stays higher longer
in this market than in the U.S. graph. The break-even points
for import and exports are approximately in the same mileage
as the U.S. with exports before imports. The main difference
being that the import break-even point is almost 200 miles la-
ter. In the Baltimore graph following the break-even point,
the rail and truck begin a dramatic divergence in the export
with the rail reaching its peak and the truck reaching its
lowest point at the 750 to 1000 mile point. After 1500 miles,
trucks become more attractive by a wide margin. With regard
to imports, the difference between the U.S. averages and
Baltimore 1s are equally a~ounding. The import-rail starts
very slowly while the import-truck has the same high curve as
the export-truck. Again, the break-even point occurs somewhere
near the 300-500 mile point, and again it is from that point
on that the numbers become absurd. Starting in the 501 to 750
mile category the trucks reach a peak that is just below their
initial starting point in the low mileage area. At the 751 to
1000 mile point the trucks are handling 95 percent of the mar-
ket whereas rail has only 5 percent. This is almost a complete
reversal from exports. After a dip to just below rails at the
1000 to 1500 mile point, trucks again leave rails declining
while they climb to a third peak in the over 1500 mile category.
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Once more trucks beat rail at its own game, especially in the
much longer dis tances. What makes this phenomenon all the more
interesting is that at the 750 to 1000 range the market area
for Baltimore is reaching its distance limits. What is more
perplexing is the fact that the rail and truck export curves
do not dip where the other rail and truck curves dip (i.e.,
the 751 to 1000 range) and that it is surpassed by the truck
curve at this point. In .i.mpo r t.s, the truck curve is very close
to the rail curve at this point after which trucks far out-
pace the rails. One can only speculate that these distances
relate to the fact that Chicago and East St. Louis are two
major container centers and that they fall within this mile-
age range. Chicago is 767 miles by rail from Baltimore and
East St. Louis is 891 miles. As to why truck over rail, this
author is without an answer.
If one looks for consolation to this problem by looking at
the fact that in the two largest export (1976) container ton-
nages were in the categories where the rail percentages were
highest (70%), it is a false hope. In 1980, the top five
states for export container movements (DMT) were Maryland,
Pennsylvania, "all other states," Ohio, and Illinois. Of
these five categories, only Illir.ois had a rail percentage
over 50 percent. After Ohio's 32 percent the other three had
percents of 8, 2, and 9. The purpose of this paper is r.ot
to frighten anyone, but looking from a layman's point of
view, the situation does not look healthy.
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Perhaps one way to explain this truck over rail preference
can be seen in Table 22 which shows why shippers in the Balti-
more market area use certain modes. In section "e", one sees
that rates are the prime reason for mode change. One also
sees that the majority of users are going to truck rather than
to rail.
For rail users, quality of service influences modal
choice decisions and has caused, and will continue
to cause, changes in the amount of rail service de-
manded. Poor transit time, car supply, and service
reliability appear to be among the most important
complaints of Baltimore rail shippers. 1 6
t:
The other priorities for mode selection are equally imporant
to some shippers as the Port of New York will show. Stolen
goods, high stevedore rates, and poor reliability have hurt
New York's standing as premier container port with the most
sailings to the most foreign ports. In 1980, the rates for
container rail shipments were deregulated in order to allow
the railroads to compete with the trucking industry. It vvill
be some time before the full impact of deregulation is felt
in the North Atlantic ports and in Baltimore in particular.
Having now ascertained that there is a problem with the
railroads in the port, it would be wise to describe some of
these problems and how they relate to Baltimore. The next
section will analyze rate and infrastructure problems in the
Port of Baltimore to show how each one is potentially hurt-
ing Baltimore's utilization of container capabilities.
TABL E 22
Inland Mod e Transporta tion
Preferences of Survey Respond ents
Primary Mode Currently
Used Total 1£ Ex p o r te r Impor t er Both
Motor Carrier 238 69.7 III 41 86
Rail 69 20.2 31 7 31
I n l a n d Waterway 1 .3 0 0 1
No t Speci f i e d 33 9.7 14 4 15
341
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Rec ent Changes in Inland Mode
Rail to Motor Carrier
Motor Carrier to Rail
Mot or Carrier to I n l a n d Mode
T OTAL
Reasons for Changing I n l a n d Mod e
Lower Costs/Rates
Reliability of Servic e
Improved Servic e
La ck of Rail Cars
Transit Time
Damage/Loss Ex p e r i e nce
Bulk Shipment Handl ing
Not Specified
Frequency Perc ent
62%
35
3100%
Frequency
15
7
4
3
3
3
1
8
SOURCE: Maryland Stat ew ide Goods Mov ement Study,
S i ma t , Hellies en & Eichner, Inc., April
1980, pp. 3-20
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v. RAILROAD PROBLEMS IN BALTIMORE AND THE PORT
When the Baltimore and Ohio (B&ORR) Railroad first came to
Baltimore in 1827 it was with 13 miles of track from a small
inland town called Mt. Clare. With that modest beginning, the
B&O brought to life the fledgling port of Baltimore. Perhaps
no other port better exemplifies the role of railroads in
early commerce development than the City of Baltimore. Early
American history is shadowed with the stories of railroads
bringing new life to seemingly barren areas. The B&ORR was
no exception.
A major railroad networking having a single port
outlet acts as a powerful solicitor for a port. In-
deed, railway solicitation is often well organized,
far-flung, and relatively more effective than of-
ficial lort promotion in attracting traffic through
a port. 7
Following an euphoric rise in development and two world
wars the Port of Baltimore realized that the once strong rail-
roads were no more and today the situation is still unre-
solved.
Baltimore is presently served by three railroads, the
Chessie System, the Western Maryland RR, and Conrail. The
Western Maryland line is basically a subsidiary of the Chessie
System and for ease of presentation the Chessie System will
be assumed to include the Western Maryland. The Canton rail-
road exists wholly within the City of Baltimore and basically
covers the northeast corner of the Port of Baltimore.
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It con-
troIs roughly 40 miles of track. A brief description of the
two major companies and their impact on Maryland is helpful
toward understanding the size of the problems involved.
The Chessie System is comprised of three operating rail-
roads - the Baltimore & Ohio (B&O) acquired in 1962, the
Chesapeake and Ohio (C&O) the parent company, and the Western
Maryland RR acquired in 1967. Most of the Maryland based
Chessie System is under daily management of the B&O. The
Chessie System controls 563.31 8 miles of main and line track
in Maryland. In the course of 24 hours, there are five
trains leaving to the West from Baltimore that are "broken"
and reclassified in Cumberland (see Figure 4), where they are
joined to other B&O trains from Philadelphia. The Chessie
System employs 7,556 employees (1976) with an annual payroll
of $109,466,056 as well as paying state and local taxes in
excess of $3,109,000.
1. In 1977, Chessie handled over 24.2 million tons
in Baltimore. Nearly 89 percent of this was
local traffic, with the remaining 11 percent
through traffic to or from Philadelphia.
2. Of the 21.4 million tons of local freight, 80
percent was inbound and only 20 percent out-
bound.
3. Nearly one half of the inbound traffic was coal.
Mixed freight and grain were also major inbound
commodities.
4. Mixed freight constituted over one half of the
outbound traffic. To a lesser degree, ore was
also significant in the outbound category.
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5. Coal, mostly for export, accounted for 39 percent
of Chessie's local traffic. Mixed freight ac-
counted for an additional 35 percent. Other com-
modities provided significantly smaller volumes:
grain at 15 percent, ore at 8 percent, and TOFC
at 3 percent.
6. Two-thirds of Chessie's traffic (mostly coal, 19
grain, and ore) is directly related to the port.
Conrail is a conglomeration of bankrupt railroads. The
company issued shares that are almost entirely owned by the
¥ederal Government. of the track that Conrail inherited, the
majority belonged to the Penn Central R.R. In MarylandJCon-
rail controls 207.8 miles of track and is the only railroad
that can enter Dundalk terminal without paying a per car as-
sessment. Conrail in 1976 employed 1,766 people whose wages
and taxes amounted to 25.2 million. Both Conrail and Chessie
claim to have attracted numerous industries to the state.
1. In 1977, Conrail handled 20.2 million tons in
Baltimore. Approximately 13.2 million tons,
or two-thirds of the total, were through traf-
fic. Northbound through traffic was heavier
than southbound traffic.
2. Of the 7 million tons of local freight, 4.6
million tons, or 66 percent, were inbound to
Ba.l timore and 2.4 million tons, or 34 percent,
were outbound.
3. The major inbound commodites were mixed freight
and grain, followed by lesser amounts of coal
and trailer- or container-on-flatcar (TOFe).
4. The major outbound commodities were mixed-
freight, ore, and to a lesser degre9, TOFC.
5. Mixed freight accounted for 41 percent of
Conrail's local traffic. Grain accounted for
another 23 percent . The remaining 37 percent
was evenly divided among ore, TOFC, and coal.
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6. Approximately one half of Conrails' local
traffic, including almost all grain, ore,
and coal and a significant amount of TOFC,
moves through the port. 21
A brief look at the enclosed colored figure shows the in-
dividual marine terminals and the railroads that serve them.
As one can tell from a cursory inspection, each railroad has
its own "turf" and in the Port of Baltimore one of the major
problems is moving individual cars from "your" terminal to
"their" terminal or vice-versa.
With the exception of New York, port development in
the United States has been of one railroad, by one
railroad, to serve one railroad. The waterfront,
the railroad pier, and even the line of ships berth-
ing at the pier have all come to be considered by
the railroad as a part of its own private system ....
When the rate structure solidified ... the only compe-
tition left between the railroads was the competition
at the terminals. The effect of this comp~tition at
the terminals for maritime freight has been to dis-
rupt American ports into as many disconnected sections
as there are railroad terminals at the port. The re-
sult has been disastrous to American port develop-
ment. 22
It is also very important when one considers large numbers
of containers arriving at one time. This is one reason why
truck rates were more attractive; the drayage charges were
never assessed on any of their trips and the containers moved
faster. The transfer of containers can be accomplished by
three basic methods: direct rail transfer, truck transfer,
and barge. Each one has its advantages and disadvantages.
These are discussed below in an excerpt from a Department of
Commerce report on the rail/port interface in Baltimore (1973).
The switching charge for the shifting of a railcar
onto or adjacent to a marine terminal for direct trans-
fer is, at $25 per railcar, relatively attractive.
However, the loss of immediate contr ol an d r e- ut i l iza-
tion of a railcar for at least several days is a dis-
advantage, especially in these days of frequent rail
car shortages and rapid turn around time requirements
for equipment.
Drayage is a more flexible and expedient method of
transfer. While drayage is more costly, it has the
advantage of releasing the railcar and eliminating
switching procedures required for direct transfer,
frequently over a competitor's trackage. 23
Baltimore has had its share of direct terminal transfer
problems and most railroads prefer the barge and truck trans-
fer to the loss of utility with other railroads' transfers.
The rate making procedure is so tightly balanced on container
movements that the loss of time and equipment to a competi-
tor's system of switching makes truck and barge transfer in-
evitable. When one adds $25 for each container, the total
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cost of a container train is unacceptable. In a House of
Representatives' hearing on railroads, Mr. Lichty, the General
Manager of Operations for Chessie, summed up the feelings of
the railroad towards moving over other rights of way:
When you operate on trackage rights of another
carrier, the financial terms under which you enter
into that kind of arrangement are critical and you
are at the other carrier's mercy from a service
standpoint because you are operating on his pro-
perty under his direction. 24
This problem of interchange between railroads is a problem
that is growing worse with the increasing volumes of traffic.
This interchange not only delays movements of cars but adds
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large costs to train movements. The following analysis came
from a Department of Transportation study of the car inter-
change problem.
The major conclusion of the car cycle analysis is
that many cars spend a large portion of their to-
tal transit time in the Baltimore terminal area.
The analysis shows that a majority of the cars
analyzed take more than a day to move from road
train to shipper/customer loading dock. (Canton
interchange traffic was excluded.) Other conclu-
sions of the analysis are:
1. Overall handling time for inbound cars appears
to be generally slower than for outbound cars.
2. Baltimore appears to be a net consumer of in-
bound loaded cars, rather than a predominant
generator of outbound loads. 25
From the above scenario, one can easily see the basis for
long delays in rail TOFC/COFC movements. It is no wonder
that the Chessie System does not interchange TOFC with Dundalk.
In fact, there have been more than a few suggestions to ease
the situation. One idea is to get the TOFC/COFC cars out of
Baltimore as quickly as possible to exterior yards where the
sorting and train building can occur. An example of this is
the Cumberland terminal for Chessie to the west of Baltimore.
This answers the criticism raised in the Baltimore Area Rail
System Study which gives the following assessment of Baltimore's
local freight facilities.
Analysis of freight yards in Baltimore indicates that,
in general they have a more detrimental effect on the
quality of local rail service than do the main lines.
Conrail in particular, has a number of serious facil-
ity problems (inherited from its predecessors) that
result in extra handling and lost time in moving cars
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to and from shippers. If projected growth in Conrail's
traffic materializes, these problems will worsen.
Chessie's yards work well, although facility problems
exist in all of them. 26
Baltimore's railroads were built between the end of the
Civil War and the beginning of the First World War. Many of
the local infrastructures were designed for shorter trains,
and smaller cars. Most of the major terminals have large prob-
lems with long trains arriving and blocking their switching
facilities or the tracks have so many bends that visual signals
must be passed by extra crews at added expense.
Among Chessie's facility-related problems is that
the length of tracks in many yards is inadequate to
switch, classify, and store the present and future
volume of cars. The increasing number of 50-foot-
long and longer cars, and the greater number of cars
per train, has exacerbated the track-length problem,
Grain and coal traffic are significantly affected.27
A prime example of old infrastructure is the B&P Tunnel on the
Conrail (AMTRAK) lines.
The B&P Tunnel in Baltimore is 8,300 feet long with three
tunnel sections separated by two open sections. The tunnel
sections have curves in them that play significant roles in
the tunnel's usefulness. When the tunnel was constructed in
1873, it was given an arched roof. In 1916, the floor of the
tunnel was dropped 2-1/2 feet to allow larger cars to pass
through. In 1959, a third track was laid in between the op-
posing tracks to allow even larger cars to pass through in the
middle of the arched tunnel. Because present-day trains are
so large, the use of the gantlet track prohibits traffic from
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entering from the opposite direction. Add to this a south-
bound uphill grade which requires helper engines to assist
heavy freight trains, and you have one colossal bottleneck for
traffic. This becomes critical because many modern freight
cars force the trains to use the center track of the tunnel.
In order to avoid this, Conrail ran the larger cars at night
~f ~
when the opposing and passenger traffic was not as heavy. Be-
cause the tunnel is used in the AHTRAK passenger scheme it
cannot be used as much as Conrail would like,yet the increas-
ing freight prospects for the Port of Baltimore hopefully will
include Conrail.
Bechtel analysis indicates that the 47 freights that
are anticipated to use the tunnel in 1990 will each
occupy the tunnel from 8 to 10 minutes. Gaps of
this duration between passenger trains could be ex-
pected only 2 to 3 times per hour, and only when all
passenger trains were on schedule, without allowance
for maintenance or emergency situations. B&P Tunnel
would be at or exceeding capacity with everyday op-
erations, assuming that approximately two-thirds of
daily freight moves during hours of passenger oper-
ation, as is the current situation. 2B
Something has to give. One solution to this is the idea
of shorter faster trains that take up less of the tunnel's
time and free it for more traffic. Perhaps a shift to heavier
night time operations would also ease the congestion. pros-
pects of easing the situation by physical changes of the tun-
nel do not look promising at this point due to heavy financial
commitments.
Old infrastructure in the Conrail system seems to be more
pervasive than on the Chessie System. Conrail depends on local
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yards to collect terminal traffic and send it out to the ap-
propriate train or the reverse process for incoming inland
traffic. The Bay View Yard is the most important Conrail yard
and also the worst offender in efficient car handling.
It lacks the capacity to receive, classify, store,
and dispatch trains. This results in congestion
on the AMTRAK main line when receiving tracks are
full, and the need to maintain serving yards to
supplement limited capacity, a condition that leads
to double yarding of many freight cars, and signif-
icant loss of time. Problems in Bay View have a
strong ripple effect throughout the entire yard
system. 29
In a study by the Federal Railroad Administration )the delay in
the Conrail yards was shown to average, over a four-day period,
between 4 hours and 1-1/2 hours per train. Fifty percent of
this was due to congestion. It takes very little imagination
to see that even in these reports, which were primarily prior
to coal expansion, that the Port is struggling to handle the
massive congestion of traffic that is coming through it. Many
times the grain elevator operators have up to five grain unit
trains arriving after a week of no trains at all. Clearly,
this pattern cannot remain if coal is to become the pervasive
and intensive cargo that is projected. If Baltimore is to ex-
pand its container market and balance the rail/truck imbalance,
then the infrastructure must be improved.
Current (TOFC/COFC) market penetration is limited by
the high drayage fees required to move containers
from shipside to the rail loading facility, the need
for multiple train handling to move the containers
from Dundalk over the circuitous routing to the de-
parture point of TOFCICOFC line-haul trains, and the
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dispersed inland destinations of containers that limit
the use of through trains to specific high volume des-
tinations. Local drayage fees are also a problem for
traffic moving from other port areas to rail-owned
TOFC terminals. 3D
One suggestien for improvement, which again stresses the
"satellite" yards outside the port area, is to allow through
trains to come directly to the port already made up for the
specific area intended. This is especially important with
large customers such as Sparrows Point (Bethlehem Steel) ,
Conrail coal trains to Curtis Bay (run by B&O RR) or ere to
the docks at the Canton Pier. Some suggestions all have the
trains being made up in specific centralized yards and being
brought directly to the terminals involved. This would neces-
sitate inter-rail agreements and cooperation. It would take
port congestion out of the port and bring it to a yard better
able to cope with the numbers involved. Again, the shorter
faster trains are a more sensible way to handle the older in-
frastructure and increase utilization.
Some other points, to be noted in the hinterland/port. in-
terchange help put the need for a longer port market reach
into perspective. While the rail industry has not kept pace
with its sister transportation systems, the Northeast region
has done even worse. One must realize that the Port cannot
be content to rest its traffic on heavy local concentration
when the area involved is declining in prosperity. Mr. John
T. Ford of the Chessie System puts this perspective on the
situation:
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In the Northeast, we are faced with a static growth.
The Northeast is a stable, densely industrial area
of the nation, but it has reached its full height.
For the Jast 4 or 5 years, we have really strained
to fino new growth in Chessie's own service area.
While reliable measures of industrial activity by
region are hard to come by, all of our studies have
suggested that growth rates in our territory will
be half the national average, at best. 3l
It is not difficult to see that areas outside of the North-
east will be the targets for railroad and port development.
National systems are now the predominant cargo carriers. Rail-
road mergers have placed long stretches of single control track
into freight operations against equally strong trucking firms>
who until recently had a monopoly on deregulated cargo. How-
ever, any rail system is only as strong as the terminals that
serve it. If a container train for Chicago cannot leave
Baltimore because of congestion or territorial disputes, the
time advantage and Baltimore's distance advantage are lost.
Landbridge, mini- and microbridge are all thriving intermodal
systems that depend on fast transit to make the route competi-
tive. By taking large numbers of freight cars to major sort-
ing points Jeconomies of scale are heightened. Baltimore can-
not afford to lose any ground to other ports by neglecting
these systems.
While Baltimore is doing well with the large export flow
of coal, the burgeoning market for it has placed the Port at
its limits. Samuel B. Nemirow, Assistant Secretary of Commerce,
for Maritime Affairs, had this to say about East Coast coal
ports.
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Rail and port loading facilities on the East Coast now
are at or near capacity. They were designed to handle
metallurgical coal stored in rail cars. steam coal re-
quires ground storage, which is not readily available,
and little or no blending at the pier. Present facil-
ities also make the operation of unit coal trains im-
practical. Resultant inefficiencies in unloading are
costing at least $3 a. ton and contribute to the high
cost of overland rail transportation from mines to
East Coast ports. 3 2
While Chessie is expanding at Hagerstown and building a new
yard ±IT Brunswick, Md., what are the other railroads doing?
Is Chessie doing enough? Will the actual port track system
be ready when three major coaling piers are in full opera-
tion by 1985? While bulk is primarily a private enterprise,
the congestion from it will be public. Hopefully, Baltimore
is ready.
In this last section on the future of containers and TOFC,
perhaps the dimensions of the market available can be seen.
The theory of TOFC/COFC is to relieve the highways of conges-
tion and use trucks for the more economical short haul terminal-
shipper routes.
In theory, rail TOFC/COFC services would combine
the rail long haul advantages of fuel economy and
possibly lower cost with the short haul effici-
encies and flexibility of motor carriers, reliev-
ing the highways of the burden of long haul trucks.
While this may sound a bit simplistic, the potential is there.
The East Coast railroads predict that if service were improved
in TOFC/COFC, that they could claim 15 percent of the 4,000
tr("ailers that traverse 1-95 daily. This does not even touch
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on the interstate systems that travel East to West. The
Maryland Port Administration in its master plan (1973-1990)
predicted that by 1980 there would be 2. 76 million tons of
container traffic through the Port. In actuality, the ton-
nage was 4.6 million, almost 2 million tons over the estimate.
The market is obviously there. The Maryland State Rail Plan
(1980) goes even further in its belief in intermodal TOFCI
COFC potential; they also realize the limitations that the
facilities in Baltimore place on it.
Railroads are acknowledged to be more fuel efficient
for long haul shipments than trucks, but they are
limited in direct routing to many potential shippers
who require fast door-to-door service. More rail-
roads are realizing that intermodal shipping offers
a sizable, but underexploited market where long haul
rail and short haul truck movements are economically
and mutually feasible.
Within Maryland, especially the Port of Baltimore, in-
termodal facilities are limited, and service reli-
ability has kept the railroads' share of container
traffic low. Port traffic offers a large market for
intermodal shipments which should grow as the energy
efficiencies of rail are reflected in more competi-
tive rates in the future. 34
The railroads' potential and the drastic truck over rail
cargo movement percentages have not gone unnoticed in other
ports. In New York )the situation is similar to Baltimore's
in their dependence on truck transportation. New York has
only one railroad feeding the whole port system, yet 20 years
ago had 8 to 10 railroads in service. Mr. Kenneth Schuman,
executive director of the New York Office of Economic De-
velopment, noted:
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Unless the New York Port can extricate itself from
the present above average use of trucks and provide
the kind of rail service that will be required, the
port economy will face a steady decline. 35
The intermodal changes have left many ports unhappy, especi-
ally as these changes have generally left inefficient or longer
distance ports out of the picture. On March 23, 1981 the ICC
deregulated the TOFC/COFC 10 container rates. Before this
time, the rates were the same between New York, Philadelphia,
Baltimore and any inland area west of Pittsburg. A spokesman
for the Port of Baltimore put the mileage assessment in per-
spective by showing that both Baltimore and Philadelphia are
140 miles closer to Chicago (e.g.) and should be given the
benefit of the cost savings. He went on to say:
. it's impossible for railroads to compete with
motor carriers, if the railroads don't tie their
prices to actual costs, such as miles. 35
The above changes will continue to occur as long as competition
is allowed to move cargo as cheaply as possible. Federal agen-
cies must be careful to not overregulate industries that until
recently have not competed on an equal basis.
Several factors that could potentially improve rail's
competitive position in the future include electrifi-
cation of the track, reduced labor requirements, some
form of relief from ownership of track right-of-way,
and perhaps selected changes in some of the ICC
(Interstate Commerce Commission) regulations imposed
on the rail carriers. The potential for the future
realization of these rail improvements ~uncertain;
however, some form of competitive relief is needed
for the rail industry. Of the five major transporta-
tion modes (i.e., rail, truck, barge, airline, and
pipeline), only rail transportation is not blessed
by some form of federal support. Both truck and barge
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transportation have the advantage of federal funds be-
ing used to improve their routes. Air transport has
been subsidized for many years, and pipeline transpor-
tation is helped by eminent domain legislation as well
as less stringent ICC control. As a result, rail trans-
portation must compete in a highly competitive market
place, without some of the inherent advantages avail-
able to the other transportation modes. 3 7 (See
Appendix B.)
Perhaps the most important aspect of this new potential is the
State agencies who are helping to push this message to both
the public and the private sectors of port development. In
the Maryland State Rail Plan (1980), the Maryland Department
of Transportation recognizes this need for guidance.
In summary, Maryland's railroads are entering a
period of change which will require management
flexibility and investment--possibly at levels
not seen in recent years. The State Rail Plan
can act as an analysis tool, but the state gov-
ernment has only limited powers to change private
sector investments of operations in the rail in-
dustry. By addressing these issues in the Plan
it is hoped that a public-private partnership can
work together to provide the best, most cost-effi-
cient rail system feasible. 3 8
Baltimore and the Port must work to allow private rail
and public facilities to interchange easily and quickly.
If Baltimore is to grow at the projected rate and with the
strength necessary to stabilize these gains, then the rail-
roads must be there. This author hopes that Baltimore's past
successes will allow her to handle the future in much the
same way.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
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Both the City and the Port of Baltimore are the direct re-
sult of railroad expansion in the late 1800s and early 1900s.
Because of the proximity to the Hidwestern agricultural and
Eastern coal markets, Baltimore has traditionally been a bulk
cargo created port. Beginning in the late 1960s,Baltimore
entered the container revolution and expanded as rapidly as
the revolution. By 1980,Baltimore handled 245,800 containers
which was a growth factor of 261 percent from 1971. The
growth has already surpassed the Maryland Port Administra-
tion's predictions for 1980 by two million tons. Unfortunate-
ly, there is an equally rapid descent in the percent of con-
tainers carried by rail as opposed to truck. Added to this is
an equally sharp descent in Trailers on Flat Car (TOFC)/
Container on Flat Car (COFC) movements from the Dundalk Ma-
rine Terminal (DMT). The DMT handled over 60 percent of all
containers in the Port of Baltimore in 1980 and supplies the
most comprehensive container statistics available.
The figures and surveys available show the main reasons
for the large trucking gains centering on two major ports.
One is the rates for trucks are generally better for the
smaller shipments of containers (one to three) that make up
a large portion of the present container traffic. The second
reason is perhaps even more important. Trucks are more
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reliable and generally deliver the containers faster than the
railroads. This accounts for the fact that after 1000 miles,
the truck is the preferred carrier over rail. In Figure 4,it
~u ~
~ shown that for the U.S. as a whole rails were more economi-
cal and widely used after 400 miles. Something is wrong if
Baltimore has truck traffic outlasting rail in its most eco-
nomical form even after 1000 miles from the point of origin.
It is the delay of cargo that makes rail so unattractive even
beyond the economic break-even point.
Perhaps the major reasons for delay in rail traffic are
congestion and lack of rail company cooperation. One cannot
expect a customer to allow 24 to 48 hours extra for his con-
tainer simply because Chessie cannot get his container from
Dundalk terminal (Conrail) due to intercompany friction. Much
of the congestion comes from old rail infrastructure made for
smaller cars and shorter trains. This is best shown in the
Bay View Yard and the B&P Tunnel. One solution (e.g., Cumber-
land) may be to utilize yards outside of the port for consoli-
dation clunit trains destined for particular marine terminals.
This would alleviate some of the congestion around the city
and port while allowing for shorter trains due to more regular
arrival of cargo from the consolidation point and the removal
of the need for local switching operations.
Perhaps the most important point to be recognized in the
changing port roles for cargo movements is the idea that ports
are consolidation points for cargo that may be going beyond
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its normal hinterland. This is best shown in the concept of
landbridge and minibridge whereby cargo destined for the West
Coast from Europe is shipped via train from New York rather
than through the Panama Canal via ship. This saves roughly a
week over the water route to the West. But if containers or
even empty coal hoppers are delayed in leaving Baltimore, then
the Port begins to become uneconomical as a gateway to export/
import markets. Time is money and congestion costs time to
both shippers and carriers. With the new international and cross
country rail movementslBaltimore cannot allow old rai infra-
structure to remove any options for cargo movements. It is
foolish to believe that trucks can continue to compete with
rail as fuel prices rise. With over 4,000 containers moving on
1-95 each day it cannot be denied that there is a market for
fast movements of containers either as TOFC or COFC.
Coal, while not a major concern of this paper, cannot be
overlooked in its impact on the port's rail congestion. If the
port has difficulty in returning empty hoppers to the coal
fields) then delivery must also slow down,and hence ship depar-
ture times. If coal trains hold up container trains or vice
versa, then everyone loses. While coal is primarily a "private"
concern, the congestion it may cause is port-wide. There must
be a cooperative effort if the "private" rail lines are to
serve the "public" port.
If this author has presented a bleak picture)it is with
optimism that it is shown. The ability to correct the situation
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is available and past experience has shown that Baltimore can
change with the needs of technology. The growth of containers
is a good example. Without the railroads and the links for
economic; long distance transportation, Baltimore will have a
difficult time enlarging its traditional hinterland. One has
only to look at Boston to see a once strong port hobbled be-
cause of no rail connections. This author feels that the Port
of Baltimore will prosper and will correct the problems at hand
with rail movements. Hopefully this optimism is well founded.
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APPENDIX A
Before discussing the various proposed rules, it
is necessary to describe here the handling of this in-
ternational traffic over a typical ocean-rail route, and
also over a competing all-ocean route. Container traffic
originating in Tokyo, Japan, frequently moves by ocean
carrier to San Francisco or Los Angeles, Calif., where
the containers are transferred to a rail carrier for trans-
portation to such eastern seaports as Philadelphia, Pa.
The joint line-haul rate for the ocean-rail service does
not include the stuffing of the container at Tokyo nor the
unstuffing of that container in Philadelphia, nor does it
cover the picking up of the container at the ocean carri-
er's yard, stuffs the container at the shipper's dock, and
returns the container to the ocean carrier's yard where
that carrier then loads the container on board ship. A
bill of lading is issued at Tokyo by the ocean carrier
to the shipper. At San Francisco the ocean carrier un-
loads the container and delivers it to the railroad's
piggyback ramp, where the railroad loads the container
onto a flatcar for transportation to Philadelphia. At
San Francisco the railroad frequently issues a bill of
lading to the ocean carrier just as if the latter were
a shipper. After the railroad unloads the container at
Philadelphia, the consignee delivers the container to his
own dock where the consignee unstuffs the container.
The above-described ocean-rail traffic competes
with all-ocean service which moves from various far
eastern points such as Tokyo via the Panama Canal to vari-
ous eastern seaboard ports of which Philadelphia is typi-
cal.
Source: 346 ICC 690.
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APPENDIX B
Total Federal Subsidies to Transportation
(Excluding Expenditures from User Chargers)
Fiscal Year 1979
(Dollars in Millions)
MODE
Motor carriers
Inland waterways
Great Lakes - St. Lawrence Seaway
Ocean shipping
Aviation
Rail transportation
Mass transit
Total
Right-of-way facilities
construction, operations
and maintenance
$325.0
291. 0
45.1
463.0
488.0
o.
250.0
$1,862.5*
* In contrast, the rail industry spent $1.47 billion on mainten-
nance of way in 1972 plus paid $1.2 billion for interest on
debt on such facilities, a total cost of $2.67 billion.
(II) Federal and Private Expenditures for Right-of-Way
Facilities for Ground and Domestic
Water Freight Transportation 1972
(Dollars in Millions)
Operating
revenues
Expenditures
Property taxes
paid to State
or local
government
Railroads Class 1 $13,400 $2,670
Rail-Competitive
MotQrcarriers 27,590 1,600
Inland waterway
operators 590 None
Great Lakes 205 None
$185
None
None
None
Source: Materials Concerning the Effects of Government Regulation
of Railroads and an Economic Profile of Railroads in the United
States; House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Transportation
and Commerce, 1975.
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